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REINVENTING CIVIL PROCEDURE: WILL THE




Congress, the American Law Institute, the Federal Judi-
cial Center, various courts and commentators have been grap-
pling with the question of how to resolve mass tort cases fairly
and efficiently.' At the same time, however, some commenta-
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law;
Chairperson of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. I wish to thank Andrew
Gordon and Simon Roosevelt, both members of the Fordham Law School Class of
1994, for their outstanding assistance in the preparation of this Article.
' Various bills have been introduced in Congress to deal with the resolution of
mass torts. None have been enacted, generally because of concerns about federaliz-
ing tort law. See, e.g., Uniform Product Liability Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993); Product Liability Reform Act, S. 140, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); Product
Liability Reform Act, S. 100, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Federal Tort Claims Act,
H.R. 4770, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); Government Contract Liability Act, H.R.
4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
The American Law Institute AL") approved the Complex Litigation Project
in May 1993. The Project contains a wealth of ideas, as well as citations to the
cases and literature in the area of complex litigation, which would be of particular
use in mass tort cases. The Project takes a broad-based approach to expanding the
role of the federal courts in aggregating similar complex cases. It also provides for
transfer of cases and "reverse removal" from federal courts to state courts if the
state court consents and if the states adopt appropriate legislation that would
permit courts of participating states to transfer cases among themselves. See
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PRoJEcT § 4.01 (1993).
Rather than seeking an extension of federal court jurisdiction, the Project
relies on transfer from state and federal courts to a transferee court (federal or
state). The transferee court would then consolidate the cases for aggregate disposi-
tion. The ALI proposal is extremely broad in that it contains no express numerical
limitations on the kinds of litigations that could be subject to the proposal. The
test potentially would allow transfer and consolidation of all cases arising out of
the same basic transaction that is the basis of a pending federal court action.
The Proposal uses existing methods of aggregation, consolidation and class
actions, rather than creating a new aggregation device. Federal "intrasystem con-
solidation" would be enhanced by expanding multi-district litigation ("MDL) trans-
fers under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 through use of a Complex Litigation Panel, articulat-
ing efficiency criteria and extending authority to the transferee court over trial as
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tors question whether there is a real need for the myriad and
fundamental amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure ("Federal Rules"), which became effective December 1,
1993. Indeed, we may be better off with mere "tinkering
changes"3 to the Federal Rules than the fundamental changes
occasioned by these recent amendments. As we found with the
well as pretrial proceedings. Federal-state "inter-system consolidation" would be
accomplished by expanded removal to federal court and consolidation of actions
pending in state courts meeting the same transaction test as an action pending in
federal court. There also are provisions for broad supplemental jurisdiction, anti-
suit injunctions, court-ordered notices of intervention and preclusion of nonparties
and a federal choice-of-law standard. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra, §§ 5.01-
.05.
Under the leadership of Judge William W Schwarzer, the Federal Judicial
Center has been working on proposals for resolving the asbestos litigation and
other mass torts. Numerous lower courts have had to grapple with how to handle
mass tort cases. See generally Georgene M. Vairo, Multi-Tort Cases: Cause for
More Darkness on the Subject, or a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54
FORDHAMi L. REV. 167 (1985) [hereinafter Vairo, Multi-Tort]; see also Georgene M.
Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (Or Found)?, 61
FORDHAM L. REV. 617 (1992) (discussing the history and philosophy of the Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust) [hereinafter Vairo, Dalkon Shield]; Symposium, Claims
Resolution Facilities and the Settlement of Mass Torts, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
1 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for
Procedural Progress, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 761-62 (1993); Linda Mullenix, Hope Over
Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovey and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C.
L. REV. 795, 802 (1991); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or
Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 659, 688 (1993).
Rule 26(a) contains perhaps the most controversial of the amendments. In-
deed, in his transmittal letter of May 1, 1992, to the Honorable Robert E. Keeton,
Chair of the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference, the Hon. Sam C.
Pointer, Chair of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, characterized the pro-
posed rule as "controversial." Letter from the Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Chair of the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, to the Honorable Robert E. Keeton, Chair of
the Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference 1 (May 1, 1992) (on file with
the author). The rule requires mandatory early, pre-discovery disclosure of informa-
tion that formerly required an adversarial request. The rule has been attacked as
a threat to the traditional attorney-client relationship-i.e, the adversarial system
as we know it. See id. To the extent that the rule requires a lawyer to volunteer
information damaging to her client, the proposed rule certainly appears to be an
attempt to shift the mindset of lawyers. Similarly, Rule l1's amendment in 1983
was designed to encourage lawyers to think less like adversaries and more like
officers of the court. See GEORGENE M. VAIRO, RULE 11 SANCTIONS: CASE LAW
PERSPECTIVES AND PREVENTIVE MEASURES § 1.01, at 1-4 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp.
1993).
' Dissent from Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S.
997, 1000 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.).
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1983 amendments to Rule 11, all the new words, concepts and
procedures may lead to more ancillary litigation, not less."
On the other hand, as Professor Deborah Hensler notes,
there is widespread agreement that the civil justice system has
not worked well in resolving mass tort cases.5 Because I am in
agreement with much of what Professor Hensler writes, rather
than formally respond to her paper I will use it as a point of
departure. I will argue that the 1993 amendments in them-
selves will not materially affect the resolution of mass torts.
Rather, more thought ought to be given to the more effective
use of existing procedural techniques and the development of
new consolidation techniques for use in mass tort cases. Per-
haps more importantly, there needs to be a fundamental
change in the professional ethic that lawyers and judges bring
to the resolution of mass tort cases. The classic autonomy mod-
el of the adversarial system does not seem to work well in
mass tort cases. To the extent that the 1993 procedural inno-
vations are premised on a move away from the traditional
adversarial model, they may begin to provide a foundation for
a shift to a new ethic and model of lawyering.6
After considering the debate between civil procedure re-
formers and preservationists, Part I of this Article demon-
strates that the mass tort case presents its own problems
which must be addressed, but which have not been the focus of
most current civil procedure reform. Perhaps most importantly,
Part I argues that the debate over the 1993 amendments is
' See Georgene M. Vairo, Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60
FORDHAM1 L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1991) (discussing growth of Rule 11 litigation and
noting that "secondary writing about Rule 11 comprises a cottage industry"); see
also Gerald Hess, Rule 11 Practice in Federal & State Courts: An Empirical, Com-
parative Study, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 313 (1992); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil
Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 485-86 (1988-89). Rule 11 litigation has
spawned several books. See, e.g., VAIRO, supra note 2 (empirical studies).
Deborah Hensler & Mark Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961 (1993); see also Michael
J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992)
("Commentators of every persuasion agree that mass torts . .. confront the justice
system with serious problems for which it has yet to find solutions."); Symposium
on Problems in Disposition of Mass Related Cases and Proposals For Change, 10
REV. LITIG. 209 (1991).
6 See supra note 2 (discussing how the new Rule 26(a) duty of disclosure and
Rule 11, as amended in 1983, are attempts to encourage a less adversarial form of
lawyering in which lawyers act more as officers of the court).
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largely irrelevant in the context of mass tort cases because the
amendments do not implicate the problem of access restriction
to the federal courts. The 1993 amendments generally focus on
the "front end" of litigation, the pretrial process, giving rise to
the debate about access restriction. Part I demonstrates that
mass tort cases do not present the issue of access restriction,
rather, they raise the problem of how to resolve the many
cases that are in federal court fairly and efficiently. Thus, Part
II then considers what we should do about the mass tort case.
It analyzes aspects of the debate over the propriety of manage-
rial judging and whether special rules ought to apply in the
context of mass tort cases. It also discusses why special rules
are justified and, indeed, necessary in the mass tort context.
Part II then offers a framework for approaching the resolution
of mass tort cases, and concludes by suggesting that new
modes of lawyering need to be developed to resolve mass tort
cases successfully.
I. THE REFORMER V. PRESERVATIONIST DEBATE: RELEVANT TO
THE MASS TORT CASE?
Professor Jeffrey Stempel attempts to divide the world into
two camps: the preservationists and the reformers.' He pic-
tures preservationists as the liberals, who argue for continued
easy and open access to the federal courts and liberal, pro-
plaintiff rules of discovery.' And he casts the reformists as the
conservatives, who seek to limit access to the federal courts
and to make it easier to dispose of cases once there.9 Indeed,
the fear of preservationists, and I am one of them especially
when it comes to Rule 11,1° is that the reform movement is
largely access-restricting. Much of the trend appears to favor
stricter pleading standards, higher duties of investigation be-
fore filing (both to comply with Rule 11 and now to insure that
one will be in a position to "do disclosure"), more restrictive
discovery and the use of Magistrate Judges and alternative
dispute resolution ("ADR")." Much of this drive for ostensibly
Stempel, supra, note 2 at 688.
6 Id. at 688-90.
9 Id.
1 See Vairo, supra note 4, at 484-86 (discussing "chilling effect" of Rule 11).
" See Stempel, supra note 2 at 669.
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greater efficiency in case resolution would result in less oppor-
tunity to be heard by the "real" judge. 12
The need for the rather drastic proposed changes to the
Federal Rules 3 may have little to do with problems inherent in
the civil justice system. Rather, the need for greater efficiency
is in substantial part a by-product of the Speedy Trial Act, 4
our alleged "War on Drugs"" and the failure of the Executive
12 See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)
(criticizing trend towards alternative dispute resolution as minimizing role judges
play in dispute).
1 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146
F.R.D. 401, 405-90 (1993); see also Linda Mullenix, Civil Rule Revisions a Mixed
Bag, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 23, 1993, at S14 (discussing the proposed rule changes). The
Supreme Court approved the proposed rule changes suggested by the Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and then forwarded
them to Congress pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072. See Letter from Chief Justice
William Rehnquist to Congress, 113 S. Ct. (Preface) 477 (1993). The House of
Representatives then deleted a major provision of the proposed Rule 26(a)(1). See
Ann Pelham, House Junks Plan to Modify Discovery Rules, RECORDER, Nov. 8,
1993, at 1, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, RECRDR File. That provision re-
quires litigants to share documents and witnesses with each other before pre-trial
discovery. See FED. R. CrV. P. 26(a)(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1993). The Senate,
however, failed to enact legislation to suspend or delete the controversial provi-
sions. Accordingly, the entire original package became effective upon Congress'
failure to act by December 1, 1993. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074
(1988). For a complete discussion of the Rules Enabling Act and the rulemaking
process, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982).
14 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-56, 3161-74 (1992). The Speedy Trial Act requires that
courts try criminal cases within seventy days of a defendant's indictment. Id.
Thus, courts spend the majority (if not all) of their time handling criminal mat-
ters. See, e.g., Sheldon H. Elsen, Why Business Can't Get its Day in Court, FOR-
TUNE, Apr. 22, 1991, at 251 ("The main reason can be traced back to a series of
poorly thought through political decisions to push essentially all criminal cases
ahead of essentially all civil cases. The process started with the Speedy Trial
Act . . . ."); Next Federal Crime: Expired Parking Meters, CHi. LAW., Dec. 1992, at
6 ("[G]iven the federal speedy trial act for criminal cases, the trials of civil cases
have been swamped. In many federal districts, a civil case has not been tried in.
years.").
iG A LEXIS search produced 5470 articles containing the phrase "war on
drugs," perhaps indicating how important this "war" is both to the media and to
the public. Courts, however, simply cannot keep up with these resultant drug cas-
es. See, e.g., Is the U.S. Justice System in a State of Crisis, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 2,
1993, at 23 ("wlar on drugs ... [is] the main culprit[] for the overcrowded dock-
ets"); Elsen, supra note 14, at 23 ("These courts suffer from a paralyzing overload
of cases . . .the result of factors as diverse as the drug epidemic in our streets.");
Irving R. Kaufman, Reform For a System in Crisis: Alternate Dispute Resolution in
the Federal Courts, 59 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 5 (1990) ("[T]he greatest pressure on
our court system ... is the 'war on drugs'.").
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and Legislative branches to appoint and confirm speedily the
full complement of federal judges. 16
Nevertheless, there are some "civil" causes for the appar-
ent need to bring about procedural change. During the last few
decades, there, has been an explosion of new statutory and
common law causes of action, which has led to increased fil-
ings, especially in the area of mass torts. 7 Thus, unless and
until something is done to reorient our federal judicial resourc-
es toward civil cases and away from criminal ones it will ap-
pear that there is a need "to do something" about the perceived
costs and delays of the federal civil justice system. 8 The use of
procedural reform to combat substantive problems, however,
has raised a question about the motives of those seeking fun-
damental changes in the Federal Rules.
Indeed, it may be that the real push for drastic reform
comes from the reformer/conservatives; much of the recent
reform appears to be access-restricting. Perhaps those opposed
to the philosophy of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are taking advantage of this stressful time to stand the rules
on their head. 9 On the other hand, I do not think that all of
those participating in the reform effort have a restrictive agen-
da. Indeed, as Professor Richard Marcus has shown, it appears
16 See, e.g., Elsen, supra note 14, at 23 (discussing problem of judicial vacan-
cies as contributing factor to courts' inability to hear civil cases); Court Vacancies
Await New President, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1992, at Al; see also Judicial Vacan-
cies, 128 F.R.D. 143 (1989) (discussing problem of judicial vacancies in Second
Circuit).
1" See generally Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) about our Allegedly Contentious and
Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983) (citing cases); Jack B. Weinstein &
Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV.
269, 306-16 (1991).
1 See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases:
A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REv. 851, 854 (1984) (not-
ing that the criticisms of the tort system are that it is "cumbersome, costly and
haphazard to accomplish its . . . objectives"); Roger H. Trangsrud, Joinder Alterna-
tives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 779, 781-82 (1985) ("The per-
ceived inefficiencies, costs, and delays associated with mass tort litigation have
provoked calls for reform . . ").
"9 The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 marked the
beginning of an "open model of adjudicatory procedure stressing simplicity, liberal
pleading, broad discovery, and a preference for substance over form, with
procedure's primary mission to be the just resolution of disputes." Stempel, supra
note 2, at 714.
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to be true that our profession has a tradition of trying to make
the rules better and to improve practice, generally with a neu-
tral orientation and result." Moreover, during this period of
time, standards of practice and professionalism unquestionably
have fallen, contributing to the perception that our system is
in real trouble.2 This is a problem that must be addressed.
I would argue, however, that because the mass tort is
different, as Professor Hensler demonstrates,22 the debate be-
tween the preservationists and the reformists is a false dichot-
omy in the mass tort case. Perhaps Professor Stempel had a
hard time characterizing Judge Jack Weinstein because he
could not square Judge Weinstein's general "Liberal Ethos" '
with the judge's aggressive use of consolidation techniques in
mass tort cases such as Agent Orange, the asbestos litigation
and the repetitive stress litigation, which some think are
tools for the advantaged. However, judges and others con-
cerned with resolving mass torts cases understand that open
access is not the problem. Rather, it is what we should do with
the mass of cases working their way through the system that
is the problem.
Professor Hensler's discussion of how mass tort cases are
different explains why the open-access problem is not typically
an issue in such cases. The economics of mass tort cases in-
22 See generally Marcus, supra note 2, at 760.
21 See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams, The Legal Profession: A Critical Evaluation, 74
JUDICATURE 77 (1990) (discussing decline in professionalism over last two decades);
Colin Croft, Reconceptualizing American Legal Professionalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1256 (1992) (discussing negative perceptions of legal profession); Bryant G. Garth,
Rethinking the Legal Profession's Approach to Collective Self-Improvement: Compe-
tence and the Consumer Perspective, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 639 (discussing lawyer
competence and public perceptions of legal profession).
' See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 5, at 965 (explaining that three factors
distinguish the mass tort from ordinary personal injury litigation: "the large num-
bers of claims associated with a single 'litigation,'" 'commonality of issues and
actors among claims within a litigation" and "the interdependence of claim val-
ues").
' Professor Marcus defines the Liberal Ethos as a concept whereby "lawsuits
should be resolved in court on the merits and that courts should eschew detail."
Marcus, supra note 2, at 761; see Linda Mullenix, Mass Tort as Public Law Liti-
gation: Paradigm Misplaced, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 585 (1994).
2 See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U.
L. REV. 469, 476-77 (1994) (listing consolidation as one of primary means of "pro-
viding a fair and speedy compensation system that also reduces transaction costs"
in the mass tort case).
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sures that claimants eventually will have plenty of opportuni-
ties to assert their claims. As Professor Hensler points out, the
risks for plaintiffs' attorneys and defendants are not symmetric
when a mass tort presents itself." The risks for corporate de-
fendants are much higher, thereby providing claimants, as a
group, with leverage they otherwise would not have. Thus,
defendants may be more willing to settle questionable claims,
which leads plaintiffs' lawyers "to dig deeper into the potential
claimant pool."26 Moreover, Professor Hensler is right in that
the dynamics of the process are likely to drive the cases for-
ward until the entire population has made a claim or until the
defendant has exhausted its resources, and even then, the case
will go on in Chapter 9 or 11.27
Professor Hensler's definition of mass tort cas-
es-numerosity, commonality and "interdependence of claim
values"28-works well enough, especially when we add the
notion that the claimants have one certain target, the manu-
facturer, to go after due to developments in substantive law. 9
The interdependence of claim values factor is important in
several respects. Certainly what goes on in the first cases will
have a dramatic impact on claim values." But so, too, will lat-
er ones. Eventually there will be a range of values established
by the cases being tried, which ultimately may lead to the
possibility of using consolidation techniques, such as class
actions, to achieve a global settlement.31 The Dalkon Shield
litigation provides an excellent example.
25 See Hensler and Peterson, supra note 5, at 961.
28 See Weinstein, supra note 24 at 537. Judge Weinstein also points out that
"consolidations do tend to encourage the commencement of suits of questionable
merit." Id. at 480.
27 See id.; see also Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 17, at 270 (stating that
"defendants' liabilities exposure is also of an unprecedented magnitude that fre-
quently threatens companies or even entire industries with bankruptcy"). See gen-
erally Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1984)
(discussing relationship between mass tort cases and bankruptcy).
28 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 5, at 965.
25 See id. Hensler notes the importance of several aspects of substantive law:
the development of product liability law, market share theory, successor liability
and the continuous trigger theory.
"0 See id. at 967; see also infra notes 32-43 and accompanying text (discussing
A.H. Robins' experience with the Dalkon Shield cases).
"1 For a further discussion of the global settlement problem, see infra notes 77-
79 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59: 1065
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In the early cases, A.H. Robins, the manufacturer of the
product, generally won,32 perhaps due to ineffective discovery
by plaintiffs just feeling their way or, perhaps, to an effective
document retention plan by the defendant, depending upon
one's point of view.3 Also, the defense victories might have
been a product of our traditional tort system. Plaintiffs' law-
yers tended to go it alone at first; perhaps it was their entre-
preneurial spirit that kept them working in isolation, or a
desire to keep their cases to themselves so that they could
become the experts." Whatever the motivation, traditionally
there was not much information sharing in the early stages of
a mass tort.35
In the later Dalkon Shield cases, however, plaintiffs won
and won big, in terms of both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.36 Indeed, in the Tetuan case, 7 the jury returned a verdict
amounting to almost $10 million: $1.75 million in compensato-
ry and $7.5 million in punitive damages.3 Seeing the
handwriting on the wall, A.H. Robins filed for bankruptcy
protection a few months later. 9 One of the ramifications of
such a victory is the potential use of collateral estoppel, argu-
ably the most important "procedural" rule in the context of
mass tort cases.4 °
22 See Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1, at 626.
See id.
3, Professor John C. Coffee, Jr., has written a series of articles exploring the
role of plaintiffs' lawyers, primarily in securities cases. See, e.g., The Regulation of
Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class
Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Regulation]; Understand-
ing the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private En-
forcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669
(1986). His observations also are applicable to plaintiffs lawyers in mass tort liti-
gation. See also Weinstein, supra note 24, at 502-03 & n.137.
" Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 903 (stating that "[information costs and
transaction costs inhibit joint ventures among attorneys working on the same or
related mass exposure claims"). But see Paul D. Rheingold, The MER129 Story-An
Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CAL. L. REV. 116, 125-28, 130-
31 (1968) (discussing how plaintiffs and their lawyers benefitted from pretrial
consolidation and information sharing).
See Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1, at 626.
3 Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987).
3' See id.
3' Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1, at 626-27.
' Indeed, this is where Agent Orange meets the "Blue Bus." See generally
Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Fact Finding at the Frontier of
Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521 (1986) (discussing the difficulties plaintiffs have
1993]
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This, of course, leads to the second interdependence point,
a point that cannot be ignored-the "bet your company" fac-
tor." Depending on how these quasi-procedural issues get
resolved, once we get to the Tetuan point,42 there should be
enough litigation experience to establish a range of claims
values, but probably not enough money to pay all the people
who have been injured. For this reason, it made sense for A.H.
Robins to elect the bankruptcy solution.43 Moreover, even if
there is enough money, there will be a cloud of uncertainty
about the prospects for payment. Certainly, the point at which
a company files for bankruptcy is an appropriate time for re-
solving the whole case. But is there a better time, an earlier
time, when courts should intervene more aggressively to at-
tempt to achieve a global resolution through the use of consoli-
dation techniques?" And how should courts do so?
proving global causation issues in toxic tort cases). Once plaintiffs establish causa-
tion in a particular case, however, there is the potential for non-mutual offensive
collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Fraley v. American Cyanamid
Co., 570 F. Supp. 497 (D. Colo. 1983). See generally Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). On the other hand, many commentators have dis-
cussed the unfairness that can result when offensive collateral estoppel is applied
in mass tort cases. See Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of
the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 304 (1957). Professor Currie discusses
an example in which plaintiffs 1 through 25 lose but plaintiff 26 wins; he argues
that applying non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to benefit plaintiffs 27
through 50 would be unfair to the defendant. The Parklane Hosiery Court, which
had endorsed the use of the doctrine, cited the Currie example as a case in which
the doctrine should not be applied. Id. at 331 n.14.
4 See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 5, at 969.
42 See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
A.H. Robins filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. II 1992), after facing an "avalanche of
actions filed in various state and federal courts throughout the United States .. .
seeking damages for injuries allegedly sustained by the use of an intrauterine
contraceptive device known as a Dalkon Shield." A-H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788
F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986). See Vairo, Dalkon
Shield, supra note 1, at 626-31 (discussing bankruptcy case); see also MORTON
MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, & THE DALKON SHIELD (1985);
RICHARD B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANK-
RUPTCY (1991).
Indeed, the asbestos cases forced a similar result on almost half of the asbes-
tos defendants. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 5, at 818 n.17.
" Many commentators are skeptical about the use of consolidation techniques
to resolve mass torts because of a concern that aggregation deprives plaintiffs of
their due process rights. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Consolidation of Com-
plex Litigation: A Critical Evaluation of the ALI Proposal, 10 J.L. & CoM. 1
1074 [Vol. 59:1065
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II. WHAT To Do ABOUT THE MASS TORT CASE
It is inaccurate to argue that the explosion in mass litiga-
tion, and the resulting problems of resolving them, are solely a
product of procedure. Procedure did not create the mass tort
litigation problem. In fact, I think it is fair to say that external
factors, such as those pointed out by Professor Hensler-mass
marketing techniques, new technology, improved epidemiology,
mass media reporting,45 the ability of plaintiffs' lawyers to
advertise,46 greater coordination among plaintiff lawyers,4' as
(1990); Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U.
ILL. L. REV. 69; Transgrud, supra note 18. Others, however, have tried to show
that even aggregated trials have the potential for achieving a level of justice that
may not be possible in individual trials. See Saks & Blanck, supra note 5, at 815;
see also infra notes 75-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the phases of
a mass tort case.
"' See Galanter, supra note 17, at 50 (commenting on the increased coverage of
the law by mass media).
46 Id. at 50-51 (noting that the "collapse of restrictions on lawyer advertis-
ing ... has accentuated the visibility of lawyers and increased dissemination of
information about legal opportunities").
" See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 480 (discussing networking of plaintiffs
attorneys in breast implant litigation); Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 17, at
283 ("[The plaintiff's mass torts bar... has aided aggregation by setting up
steering committees and information-pooling centers."). An issue dividing the
plaintiffs' bar is the extent to which it is appropriate to represent large numbers
of plaintiffs, together with the issue of whether consolidation is the best means for
achieving justice for injured parties. For example, in the Dalkon Shield litigation
and in the breast implant litigation, there have been tensions between the group
of traditional tort lawyers, who represent relatively few plaintiffs, and those who
represent hundreds if not thousands of plaintiffs. Typically, the traditional tort
lawyers are opposed to aggregation, while those who represent large numbers of
claimants are usually more positive about the use of aggregation techniques and
administrative and alternative dispute resolution schemes.
In the Dalkon Shield litigation, representation patterns were interesting.
There were 44,128 Option 3 claimants (those who believed themselves to have the
most serious provable claims). They are broken down as follows:
* 11,443 unrepresented claimants.
* 7101 claimants represented by a lawyer who has fewer than ten Dalkon
Shield Claimants.
9 8039 claimants are represented by six lawyers. These six lawyers report
from 963 to 1656 claimants each. Some of these lawyers also have agreements
with other attorneys to evaluate or do most of the work on the other lawyers'
clients' cases, but we cannot track those relationships.
e 13,174 claimants are represented by 43 lawyers who are handling between
100 and 1000 Option 3 claims. One of the lawyers with 161 clients has sub-
mitted materials on only 12 of his clients' claims.
Thus, almost half of the represented claimants are represented by lawyers who
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well as dramatic changes in substantive law4 -- are the real
causes of the explosion. 9 But existing procedural rules appear
to be inadequate in resolving mass tort cases.
Professor Hensler notes the critique of mass tort litigation:
(1) cases take an inordinately long time to reach disposition;"
(2) outcomes are highly variable, often seeming to have little
relationship to the plaintiffs injuries or the defendant's culpa-
bility;5 and (3) transaction costs are excessive, far outstripping
the amounts paid out in compensation. 2 Thus, in mass tort
cases, there exist problems that must be solved. In fact, most
of the tools for dealing with mass torts are already in place or
have been proposed. Better use of existing rules, serious con-
sideration and adoption of the ALI Complex Litigation Pro-
ject53 and the use of dispute resolution centers have the poten-
tial to solve these problems. As Professor Hensler points out,
class actions,54 Multi-District Litigation55 and consolidation
under Rule 4256 always have been available. Thus, the real
issue is one of power and inclination to use the tools available.
Should we be encouraging or constraining the judges more or
less to take advantage of the rules that exist? Must everything
be spelled out for them by the legislature, or by the single
case/adversarial autonomous paradigm?
This is an important issue that needs to be addressed
carefully in the mass tort context. Some judges have taken an
active role in using consolidation techniques, but there are
many who criticize aggressive case management. For example,
Judge Weinstein recently has written that mass tort litigation
represent 100 to 1000 Dalkon Shield claimants. Furthermore, many of these law-
yers also had clients who selected Options 1 or 2. Thus, those who had hundreds
or thousands of Option 3 clients may have had hundreds more Option 1 or 2
clients. See Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1.
48 See supra note 29.
4' See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 5, at 962.
See id. at 963.
" Id.; see also Saks & Blanck, supra note 5, at 836 (discussing how aggregat-
ing claims will "refine out some of the random and systematic error (that is, irra-
tionality and bias) of jury decisions").
2 Id.; see Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 852 (noting that transaction costs in
mass tort cases "dwarf the compensation recovered by victims").
' See supra note 1 for a discussion of the ALI Complex Litigation Project.
"FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
85 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988).
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 42.
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ought to be considered a form of public law litigation, which
justifies a strong judicial involvement.57 I previously have writ-
ten that because mass torts may have a major impact on nu-
merous persons and on private and public institutions, mass
tort litigation ought to be analogized to public law litigation."
This position, however, is not without its critics. In reply to
Judge Weinstein's article, Professor Linda Mullenix believes
there is insufficient justification for treating mass torts differ-
ently."9 The major dispute between Judge Weinstein and Pro-
fessor Mullenix is whether the mass tort case justifies a new
set of ethics rules. And while she applauds Judge Weinstein
for his innovations and commitment, she concludes that, with
respect to the judge's role, she prefers her judges "in their
robes, and on the bench.""0
Although I am indifferent to the court's garb, it is essen-
tial for judges to be activists when managing mass torts. I
think we have no choice but to leave it to the judges to use the
existing rules creatively once we have a mass tort case. Each
mass tort case presents its own set of problems, and judges
ought to be allowed to use the flexible Federal Rules to deter-
mine the best methods for handling them.6' Unfortunately,
however, district court judges who use the rules innovatively in
mass tort cases generally run the risk of reversal by the courts
of appeals. 2 Typically, according to the district judge, the mass
Weinstein, supra note 24, at 539-60. He believes that judges ought to be
motivated by a communitarian and com~iunicatarian ethic, see id. at 540-49, and
that judges ought to be involved in settlement and post-settlement phases of mass
tort litigation.
V airo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1, at 621-23; see infra note 47.
9 Mullenix, supra note 23, at 580.
' Id. at 591 (commenting on the New Yorker article in which Judge Weinstein
discussed why he stopped wearing a robe and why he would decline to sit on the
bench).
, See Vairo, Multi-Tort, supra note 1, at 203-08 (discussing use of procedure in
the context of a mass tort case and arguing for a federal common law approach
because of different problems presented in different mass tort cases).
C2 An early example of the use of the class action to manage a mass tort effec-
tively was in the Dalkon Shield litigation. In In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon
Shield" Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 896 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983), the district court
certified a class action but the Ninth Circuit reversed. This district court's experi-
ence remains the norm. Although in some unusual cases, a court of appeals will
affirm the use of a class action as a vehicle for resolving a mass tort cases, see,
e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 880 F.2d 694 1989
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tort case compels the use of extraordinary procedure, while, ac-
cording to the courts of appeals, some principle of fairness,
vaguely stated as "individual justice," is sacrificed by the use of
consolidation. 6' But there is little explication as to how individ-
ual justice may be sacrificed, particularly when the failure to
deal effectively with mass tort cases leads to bankruptcy, seri-
ous delays in payments, wide disparities in payments or inade-
quate payments to some victims of mass torts.
Generally, I have no dispute with Professors Owen Fiss 4
or Judith Resnik about the value and importance of the formal
adjudication process. Indeed, without the effect of a court's
pronouncement in the important cases of the day, our system
of laws would not evolve. I therefore view with great skepti-
cism both the need for more procedure in most cases and the
wisdom of turning judges into mere dispute resolvers. Doing so
demeans judges and the important role they play in the evolu-
tion of the law at both the state and federal levels.
Mass torts, however, do not present the same need for
formal court pronouncements by the time a case becomes a
"mega"-case. Much of the "law" of the case should already be
established. For example, prior to consolidation, a trend may
well have been established on liability issues such as the ques-
tion of global causation. Even if it has not, an argument can be
made that the use of a consolidated trial on such an issue,
after an opportunity for full discovery and the vetting of quali-
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989), and cases cited therein, courts of
appeals have been notoriously reluctant to affirm the aggressive use of class ac-
tions or other aggregation devices as a way of resolving mass torts. Over the past
two years, the Second Circuit reversed Judge Jack Weinstein twice for using inno-
vative techniques in the asbestos litigation and in the repetitive stress cases. See
In re Repetitive Stress Injury Litig., 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Brooklyn
Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1992) (asbestos litigation).
' This was the precise debate in the Repetitive Stress Litigation. Judge
Weinstein argued that the need for consolidation of over 40 repetitive stress cases
in the Eastern District of New York was compelled by the existence of a mass
tort. See In Re: Repetitive Stress Injury Cases, 142 F.R.D. 584 (E.D.N.Y. 1992),
vacated, 11 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 1993). The Second Circuit criticized Judge Weinstein
for "substitutfing] a discussion of so-called mass torts for precise findings as to
what are the 'common question[s] of law or fact justifying consolidation" pursuant
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 42(a). Id. at 373. It also cautioned that aggre-
gation techniques must not be used when to do so would "trump our dedication to
individual justice." Id.
64 See generally Fiss, supra note 12; Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARV. L. REv. 374, 432 (1982) (discussing need to preserve formal adjudication).
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fled experts, could result in greater accuracy and, therefore,
more fairness.65 Moreover, a range of claims values may have
been established through the settlement of cases and through
jury verdicts. Once a case or series of cases becomes a mass
tort case,66 dispute resolution should be about ensuring open
access to compensation, and about achieving fairness. If there
is no recovery for some, there can be no justice.
But there are three critical problems faced by the courts,
lawyers and claimants in helping a better process for adminis-
tering mass tort cases to evolve: (1) methods for determining
when we have a mass tort case; (2) methods for encouraging
lawyers to use consolidation techniques for the good of all
claimants; and (3) developing a new paradigm for lawyering.
A. When Do We Have a Mass Tort Case And What Steps Must
We Take?
When I used the term "administering mass tort cases," I
did so advisedly, as I do not wish to begin by alienating those
who are against managerial judging. 7 As discussed above, once
we have a defined mass tort, the Fiss/Resnik "law finding"
function already will have been served.6" There will have been
much publicity in the media about the litigation problems of
the company, with widespread coverage of the path-breaking
cases. Once the litigation reaches this point, there is arguably
less need for formal adjudication, and more of a need for "man-
agerial judging" because there will be hundreds or thousands
of cases already in the pipeline, and many more on the way.69
The only real risk with managerial judging at this stage,
therefore, is that some claimants may not recover as much
once a case becomes a mass tort as they would have otherwise.
But where is it written that one claimant is entitled to more
€ 
See generally Saks & Blanck, supra note 5.
c' Of course, determining when a case is a mass tort is a problem. See infra
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
'7 See supra note 64.
" See Fiss, supra note 12, at 1084 (discussing the importance of the judge's
obligations to conduct an inquiry into both the law and the facts of a case);
Resnik, supra note 64, at 431 (same).
" See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 479 (discussing speedy and efficient consoli-
dation action in the breast implant litigation, In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant
Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992)).
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than another? What due process rights does a first-in-line
claimant have? Does that claimant have the right to get more
when it means some injured people will get less or even noth-
ing? I think not. Once this point is reached, the courts must
use all the procedures available to resolve the disputes before
them. But one of the biggest issues is determining whether the
litigation problem is so massive that courts should turn from
individual adjudication towards global solutions. Arguably the
breast implant cases were consolidated too soon.7" It might
have been preferable to wait for more settlement experience
and for more cases to go to judgment until after plaintiffs'
lawyers were sure they had uncovered all the important evi-
dence. Alternatively, courts could certify a settlement class
action, with representative claims pulled out for trial (after
expert identification) to develop claim valuation. Indeed, tradi-
tional concerns of the civil justice system have focused on the
adjudicatory function served by courts,71 individual control of
claims by plaintiffs72 and, specifically in the mass tort context,
the establishment of a range of claim values for facilitating
later case resolution.73
Courts traditionally have performed two related functions
in the usual course of case resolution, which appear to be lost
through early consolidation of claims. One is the court's role in
the development of substantive law through the resolution of
novel issues. It may be argued that the early consolidation of
cases will rob the courts of the ability to perform this function.
However, mass tort cases do not make good grist for this mill.
Instead, they most often present difficult individual causation
issues as applied to basic tort law principles. Little substantive
legal progress results from the resolution of these issues. In
any event, to the extent that resolution of global causation
issues achieves this development of substantive law function, it
can be met equally well by consolidated trial(s) of the same
70 But see Weinstein, supra note 24, at 480.
7' See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 12, at 1085 ("[The judiciary's] job is not . . . sim-
ply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values codified in
authoritative texts . . . : to interpret these values and to bring reality into accord
with them.").
2 See Epstein, supra note 44, at 5-8, 53-60 (discussing fairness and due pro-
cess problems created by consolidation).
11 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 5, at 967.
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issue(s). The other function concerns developing judicial prece-
dent with respect to claim values, both generally and for poten-
tial litigants pursuing similar claims. As to potential future
claimants pursuing the same or related claims in the mass tort
context, a paradigmatic claim value should serve equally well
given the likely substantial similarity of the claims.
Turning to the remaining traditional concern, while a
great deal of emphasis has traditionally been placed upon
individuals' ability to control their own claims, the different
nature of mass tort cases suggests that individual resolution
need not assume the same importance once the mass tort has
been identified. The benefits to be gained by consolidation may
outweigh individual need or desire to control one's own claim
when plaintiffs' time and expense may be significantly reduced
through consolidation. More importantly, and as discussed
below, 4 especially once global liability is established, whether
individual control of claims should take precedence over con-
trolled distribution by an independent dispute resolution facili-
ty should seriously be questioned.
Indeed, when the fastest plaintiffs with the most eager
lawyers are first to the courthouse, available defendant re-
sources may be overly depleted by large punitive awards. As a
result, later and perhaps more deserving plaintiffs are denied
compensatory recovery. The greater the size of the potential
claimant pool, the more likely is this possibility. The overall
objective should be the satisfaction of the largest number of
claimants to the greatest extent possible given the available
asset pool. This objective is subverted when initial claimants
deplete the pool excessively. Although it may be argued that
large awards including punitive damages are important to
deter future defendant(s) misbehavior, in mass tort cases the
number of claimants is generally so large that the necessary
pool of assets adequately serves this purpose. If sufficient as-
sets exist to compensate all plaintiffs properly, pro rata distri-
bution of a consolidated punitive damage award may still be
appropriate. In short, there is no good reason to favor individu-
al control of settlement of claims over consolidation when doing
so may negatively impact the greater good of maximum com-
pensatory recovery for all.
"' See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
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Thus, the most important objective in the resolution of
mass tort cases should be reaching global peace. As used here,
global peace includes: satisfactory resolution of plaintiffs'
claims; equitable distribution of available compensatory assets;
safeguarding the financial viability of defendant(s) when prac-
tical and possible; and the general and specific deterrence of
defendant(s). The most effective way to achieve these goals is
by consolidation at an appropriate time.75 Outlined below is a
three- phase process for (1) identifying the existence of a mass
tort case, (2) consolidating existing cases and gathering of
others, and trial of consolidated issues, and (3) resolution and
distribution of fair compensation.
It appears that mass torts go through three phases. Phase
1 is the "Private" phase, when plaintiffs begin to file cases
alleging injury from a particular product. This is the Private
phase because there has been little or no media exposure cre-
ating a stampede of cases.76 Rather, plaintiffs' lawyers have
worked with clients to develop product-defect arguments. Dur-
ing this phase, plaintiffs may win some cases but, generally,
defendants are at an advantage, usually because of questions
involving whether a product is defective or global causation
problems. Thus, they can either settle cheap or win defense
verdicts.77 At this time, arguably it would be premature to use
consolidation techniques, both because it is preferable to have
verdict and settlement benchmarks for setting claims values,
and because of our tradition of individual justice, despite the
risk that plaintiffs' discovery in this early stage will be incom-
plete.
Phase 2 is the "Consolidation" phase. Whether media expo-
sure or lawyer advertising or a serious defect leads to a steady
" "Consolidation" is used here in its generic sense-a sort of hybrid between
class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (or under proposed
Rule 23), and consolidation under Rule 42.
"' Given the rapid advancement of modem communication, it is now possible to
identify and predict potential cases when the first reports of injury from a particu-
lar product are reported in medical journals and in other news media. Indeed,
recognition of an emerging mass tort case could begin even before the first suit
has been filed. As a practical matter, however, only lawyers have been able or in
position to benefit from identification at this stage. With the very first round of
complaint filings, however, the judiciary should be alert to the need for future con-
solidation.
77 See supra note 47 (discussing Dalkon Shield experience).
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increase in filings or an explosion of cases, the courts should
now be aware of the need for an efficient means to resolve such
cases. At this point and the tricky part is determining just
when courts ought to be open to more aggressive use of class
actions and consolidation to resolve outstanding global issues,
to determine the scope of harm in terms of the number of per-
sons who may claim injury and the amount of money that will
be needed to adequately compensate the injured and, thus,
make possible a global settlement.
All consolidated claims should be broken down on the
basis of similar injury types. If there has been insufficient time
prior to consolidation to establish a range of claims values, a
representative claim or group of claims can be chosen for tri-
als. Necessary considerations in determining the representa-
tive claims should, generally speaking, be the same as those
identified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: commonality,
typicality and representativeness (of injury as well as proof).
Each of the representative claims is then brought to trial. In
this way, the waiting process for the establishment of a range
of claim values is replaced by a group of adjudicated
paradigmatic claims. Representative compensatory award
having been rendered, there will be a basis for the awards for
all other claims in the same group. A claims resolution facility
will use the representative awards as the point of departure in
Phase 3 when offering awards to other claimants of the group
depending upon injury severity and the proof presented. This
approach could be more efficient than awaiting the complete
establishment of a range of claim values in individual cases or
settlement; by specifically categorizing extant claims rather
than relying on a random group of earlier litigated claims that
may be less representative of a particular group, of insuffi-
ciently broad to cover the range of injury types, a more accu-
rate assessment of claim values is possible. The logical choice
to coordinate the early consolidation scheme is the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel"), at least until
the more expansive ALI Complex Litigation Project proposals
are adopted.7"
'8 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1988). Subsection (c) specifically provides the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ("JPML) with authority to initiate consolidation.
For a discussion of the ALl Complex Litigation Project, see supra note 1.
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When it appears more likely than not that a mass tort
case is emerging, the MDL panel should order transfer of
pending federal cases to an appropriate district court. Subse-
quent cases would be consolidated with the initial cases. Once
existing claims have been transferred, a special master should
be appointed to assist in determining further potential claims
before a class is certified or categorization of claims takes
place. This process should include the usual forms of notice in
newspapers, on radio and, perhaps, television. Additionally, an
information center or "hotline" should be established to answer
initial queries. Means must also be devised to encourage
prompt responses from potential claimants. The additional
expenditure of judicial resources is justifiable only if judicial
and litigant resources are saved by expedient consolidation.
There also should be attempts to coordinate with the state
judiciaries as Judge Weinstein did with other asbestos litiga-
tion, and as Judge Sam Pointer is doing in the Breast Implant
litigation.
The district court should then assemble an expert group to
evaluate the nature of the claims asserted. This "expert group"
should likely comprise persons with social scientific, medical
and legal expertise. It is important that the expert team be
balanced so that there will be a proponent for a spectrum of
ideas and approaches. During the settlement process, the vari-
ous classes, the defendants and other interested parties will
make projections based on the data generated by neutral ex-
perts. The claims resolution facility should use experts with
various viewpoints. In the Dalkon Shield settlement, for exam-
ple, one of our key experts, who prepared our compensation
scheme, had served as the expert for the claimants' commit-
tee. 9 By hiring him we hoped to insure the soundness and
credibility of our payment scheme. We also hired a lawyer from
one of the leading plaintiffs firms, which had settled all its
Dalkon Shield cases before the Chapter 11 case, to work with
that expert."0 In addition, there is a need for arms-length coop-
eration between the Trustees and plaintiffs' lawyers as the
"' The Trustees chose Dr. Timothy Wyant, a bio-statistician from the Claimants
Committee expert team.
80 The attorney was Martha K. Wivell from the firm of Robins, Kaplan, Miller
& Ciresi.
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claims resolution facility is being formally implemented.8
In Phase 2, through the class action device, numerous
parties and claimants can be bound, thereby achieving global
peace or nearly global peace. The device can be used to find the
claimants, to estimate future claimants by providing a notice
campaign, to obtain a settlement that provides enough money
to compensate the victims of a defective product and to create
a claims resolution facility to provide various options for pay-
ments.8 2 The global settlement can provide for the establish-
ment of a compensation facility with different payment options
depending on the type of injury, proof problems, etc. It can
provide rules for how the claims will be resolved, which claims
will be resolved first and for the appointment of independent
directors or Trustees to oversee the operation of the facility.
The trick, of course, is encouraging parties in a mass tort liti-
gation to agree on a solution. Incentives, such as timing of
payment and waiver of certain defenses, must be developed to
encourage claimants not to opt out.
The Dalkon Shield Plan 3 was adopted because of one basic
element-the idea of full compensation to all creditors. Two
other elements flowed from the element of full compensation:
(1) channelling all Dalkon Shield claims to one compensation
fund to achieve "Global Peace;" and (2) a Trust to be run by
independent Trustees appointed by the court. It was possible
to work out a plan in the Dalkon Shield case because of the
"' In the case of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, the Trustees met with
plaintiffs' counsel twice during the formative stages, but did not solicit their advice
on a regular basis. The Trustees did, however, seek their input where we felt they
could help. For example, we used an "attorney valuation project" to help us deter-
mine-or "reality check"-the claim valuation system our experts developed. We
asked thirty plaintiffs' attorneys who had numerous claimants or who were experi-
enced Dalkon Shield litigators to review twenty or so redacted claims files. We
asked them to value the claims as if they had a limited fund of a certain amount
to distribute, and as if they had unlimited funds.
Notwithstanding these contacts, the Trustees were criticized for not cooper-
ating sufficiently with plaintiffs' lawyers. It remained the Trustees' view that in
order to remain independent and, thus, to discharge their fiduciary duty to all
claimants appropriately, it was important to control the degree of communication.
This led to understandable resentments. See Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1,
at 651-54 & 656-58.
82 See Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 17, at 287-90 (discussing use of
class action device).
For a complete description of the Dalkon Shield model, from which these
suggestions are drawn, see Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1.
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bankruptcy filing. Although we have seen the beginnings of a
similar settlement in the breast implant litigation, much needs
to be done to get all parties fully aboard on the important
details.'
Phase 3 is the "Claims Resolution" phase. Whether in the
context of a negotiated or adjudicated class action settlement,
reorganization plan or other device, the final task will be to
establish a dispute resolution center to resolve fairly and effi-
ciently the individual claims asserted. The structure and orga-
nization of the Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust ("DSCT') can be
used as the model for a claims resolution facility.85 From this
point the process should proceed as it continues to at DSCT."
Offers will be made on the basis of claim form evaluation. In
light of the high degree of loss of individual control, particular
efforts should be made to ensure the highest degree of personal
attention practically possible. ADR and arbitration options
should, of course, also be preserved."
One of the main advantages of this approach is that poten-
tial claimants may be able to pursue their claims from start to
finish without the assistance of counsel. Of course, some claim-
ants will choose to retain counsel regardless, and many may
want the advice of counsel at some point during the process.88
For those who wish counsel for advice or to have counsel ap-
pointed for them, a pool of pre-screened attorneys should be
created specifically for this purpose. Lawyers or firms that
wish to enter the pool must first ensure that they will comply
" See Sandra G. Boodman, $4.75 Billion Proposed for Breast-Implant Cases,
WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1993, at Z7; Dick Lehr, $4.7b Accord Eyed on Breast Im-
plants, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 10, 1993, at 1; Breast Implant Victims May Get $4.7
Billion, Cmu. TRIB., Sept. 10, 1993, at 3; Proposed Settlement on Breast Implants,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1993, at 1.
See generally Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1.
See id. at 641-45.
8 See id. at 645-47.
In the Dalkon Shield case, over 70% of the claimants were unrepresented.
Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1, at 618. Interestingly, unrepresented claimants
electing Option 3 netted more than represented claimants. Id. at 655 n.136. Al-
though there are some questions about the need for and role of lawyers in the
dispute resolution phase of a mass tort, see infra note 100, Professors Bundy and
Elhauge have argued that lawyers' advice to clients improves the adversary sys-
tem. See Stephen McG. Bundy & Ebner Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the
Adversary System? A General Theory of Litigation Advice and its Regulation, 79
CAL. L. REv. 313 (1991).
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with certain guidelines-specifically, that some particular
experience qualifies them as appropriate advocates and advi-
sors for mass tort claimants.89 More importantly, controls
should be placed on the fee arrangements in order to prevent
current abuses by some lawyers."
B. Need for New Paradigm
Perhaps before we can hope for effective use of class ac-
tions and global solutions to mass tort cases, we will have to
accomplish even more radical goals than those articulated in
the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules. We need new
models of lawyering, arguably an important philosophical un-
derpinning of the new disclosure rule.91 This will allow a shift
from an emphasis on individuals, which arguably leads to
much of the waste in mass tort cases, to an emphasis on the
claimants as a group. Indeed, mass tort cases present an op-
portunity to question the distinction between public and pri-
vate law as well as the claimant's role in this kind of dis-
pute."
Mass tort disasters typically involve the general public.
Accordingly, we ought not continue to view private mass tort
litigation as merely settling a private dispute.93 The courts,
"' Such experience might include, for example, prior product liability, toxic or
other mass tort, or perhaps medical malpractice representation.
"o See Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without
the Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 74 (1989); Christopher P. Lu, Proce-
dural Solutions to the Attorney's Fee Problem in Complex Litigation, 26 U. RICH.
L. REv. 41, 49 (1991).
" See supra notes 7 & 13.
92 Much has been written on the problems associated with the distinction be-
tween public and private law. See Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on
the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts, Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848,
864-68; Kenneth M. Casebeer, Toward a Critical Jurisprudence-A First Step by
Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37 U. MIAMII L. REV.
379 (1983); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
'Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851 (1984). See supra
notes 59-60 and accompanying text for Judge Weinstein's and Professor Linda
Mullenix's views on this subject.
"9 See Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1, at 621-23; Weinstein, supra note 24,
at 478-88 (noting that mass torts are akin to public litigation); see also Bender,
supra note 92, at 868 (tortfeasors "imposing risks on the public ... and ...
coping with the harms resulting from those risks are public questions of the high-
est order"); David G. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 665, 666-67 (1985) (stating that tort law is "often public in its spirit and
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the lawyers, the tortfeasor and injured plaintiffs should begin
to view themselves in terms of the community.94 A focus on
protecting the whole class of injured plaintiffs will, of course,
create tensions because our traditional model views the
lawyer's duty as maximizing the recovery of his or her particu-
lar client.95 But we must confront these tensions. As we move
in the direction of group resolution, there is the obvious prob-
lem of conflicts between the themes of group participation and
individual autonomy. The current rules of legal ethics or of
lawyer-client interaction do not fit the problem of mass tort
litigation;"6 what lawyers do in mass tort cases ends up im-
pacting groups of people, whether the lawyer purports to act
for an individual client or a group of clients. Moreover, the
success of lawyers in mass tort cases may depend on the de-
gree to which they empower clients outside as well as inside
the courts.
But a problem in mass tort cases, as in much public law
litigation, is that the group of injured clients is not monolithic.
Proper representation of plaintiffs in mass tort cases will re-
quire "radical alterations in our usual methods of protecting
individual autonomy in the lawyer-client relationship."97 The
problem is determining how to weigh the values of individual
autonomy against group connection-the well-being of the
group.9" Professor Ellman has argued in the context of public
law litigation that
effect"); Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 901 ("a claims's deterrence value is . . . a
'public good'").
"' See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 477 ("[Plarticipants must be aware of the
needs of the entire community."); cf. Bender, supra note 92 at 866; Rosenberg,
supra note 18, at 907-08. But see Mullenix, supra note 23.
" See Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 907 ("[P]ublic law litigation thus seeks to
achieve the benefits of deterrence by sacrificing some of the benefits of individual-
ized treatment of claims.").
96 See generally Weinstein, supra note 24.
" Stephen Ellman, Client-Centeredness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV.
1103 (1992).
" "If lawyer-client relations can be shaped that provide effective representation
of client groups and also secure real protection for the autonomy of those group's
members, these relationships are to be welcomed precisely because they do respect
both sets of values." Ellman, supra note 97, at 1108. "If we have good reason to
acknowledge the value of both autonomy and connections in our moral lives, how-
ever, then it makes sense to question a calculus which operates to privilege one
set of claims so sharply over the other . . . ." Id. at 1109.
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[P]eople's involvement in groups can both protect and express their
autonomy; (Query-does this work only in voluntary groups; can it
work where we have 'fortuitous groups', i.e., by virtue of common
injuries or lawyers?) and at the same time, groups that respect their
members' autonomy may draw strength from that very feature of
their make-up. In the many cases where considerations of autonomy
and community coincide, only a method of representation that hon-
ors both will succeed.99
His principle applies equally well in mass tort litigation.
Indeed, applying these principles in mass tort cases to a
class action model, consent from the class representatives must
be obtained, and because of different levels of injury and proof,
subclasses would be needed. Lawyers must be sensitive to the
values at stake when counseling clients about the best model
of representation.' But once consent to proceed as a class
action is obtained, the lawyer acquires some degree of freedom
from the wishes of individual clients. The lawyer owes her
most fundamental duty to the class itself, not individuals with-
in the class.'0 ' Of course, the lawyer is not totally free to do
whatever he or she thinks is appropriate without regard for
the clients' wishes. Moreover, there will still be the problem
that some class members will opt out of a Rule 23(b)(3) class at
their lawyers' recommendation. Thus, unless the class lawyer
ensures a certain security that the needs of individuals largely
will be satisfied, there will be little prospect of a viable Rule
23(b)(3) damage class.
To date, it has been difficult to obtain certification of dam-
ages class actions except in all but the most unusual cases. 2
' Id. at 1109.
See id. at 1122 ("Group representation cannot protect individual autonomy in
the same ways, or perhaps to the same extent, as individual representation
does .... [iowever, group representation is by no means always opposed to
individual autonomy; instead, group representation is essential to protect those
aspects of autonomy that people express through their membership in groups-as
well as those values beyond autonomy's purview that republicans, feminists and
others suggest collective engagement may serve.").
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). Disagreements can be resolved without the consent of
all affected in the class structure. Judges can perform a very careful analysis of
the fairness of the settlement model and the claims resolution proposed to insure
that the amount needed to compensate the claimants is sufficient and that a
framework has been laid to guarantee fairness of treatment in the claims reso-
lution facility. There is a growing body of experts with experience in setting up
facilities that can be consulted by the court in this regard.
" See supra note 62 discussing court of appeals reversals of district court class
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Perhaps this is where the proposed amendments to Rule 23
will help, as they break down the formal distinctions among
the types of class actions in order to give the courts more flexi-
bility in obtaining global mass tort settlements.' The simple
fact is that in mass tort cases, at some point the needs of the
group of injured persons will require group representation. The
autonomy model works in the early stage of a mass tort, as the
"law giving" function and the "claim value" functions are being
served. For there to be true justice, however, it will be difficult
for victims to protect themselves against the corporate defen-
dants except through group involvement. In the Dalkon Shield
litigation, for example, it took a notice campaign to reveal the
hundreds of thousands of potential claimants to put the defen-
dant on notice of the true value of its wrongdoing. That mass
of claimants, as a group, generates the leverage. Indeed, in the
Dalkon Shield litigation, that leverage resulted in a fund of
almost two and one-half billion dollars, which was deemed
acceptable to claimants and their lawyers.
The problem, however, is identifying methods of lawyering
that will allow attorneys to honor both autonomy and connec-
tion' 4 -the "client-centered" model, as Professor Ellman
would call it-for mass tort representation. There are a num-
ber of ways to balance autonomy and connection. There could
be a steering committee of lawyers, each responsible for a
subclass, perhaps one of which consists of those who want to
opt out. These subclasses ought to be determined by the court
after expert analysis of the claims base identifies different
types of injuries and proof problems. In addition, techniques
such as focus groups or claimant meetings could be used to
identify claimant wishes. 5 In developing a decisionmadng
model for determining what the claims resolution process
should look like, there will be inevitable tensions. Should a
democracy model be used, or should the lawyers act as media-
tors of the conflicting wishes after engaging in a process of
discussion, reflection and information gathering from the
claimants?
action certifications.
'03 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (effective Dec. 1, 1993).
14 See Ellman, supra note 97 at 1127.
1 See Weinstein, supra note 24, at 542-50 (discussing communication in the
mass tort case; advocating using federal courthouse as central meeting site).
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One might argue that it would be impossible or undesir-
able to develop the model of lawyering sketched here. But we
ought to recognize that under existing rules and practice,"6
mass tort cases already present difficult ethical issues. For
example, the way in which some lawyers obtain and represent
clients presents issues of (im)proper representation. Indeed in
Dalkon Shield, nine lawyers or law firms represent over 10,000
"Option 3" claimants."' How can a lawyer or firm properly
serve hundreds, let alone thousands, of clients? 8 Simply put,
when there is multiple representation, there are issues of loy-
alty. 0
9
Perhaps the class action model provides a vehicle for the
courts to monitor the settlement of claims, thereby insuring
adequate representation."0 Typically, the federal class action
'o See generally Mullenix, supra note 23.
101 25,000 Option 3 claimants are represented by lawyers handling more than
ten Dalkon Shield claims. Over 11,000 Option 3 claimants are not represented by
counsel. The Plan contemplates that Option 3 be elected by those claimants with
the most serious Dalkon Shield injuries. There are numerous issues that such
representation raises. For example, when counseling client A, is an attorney's
judgment clouded by his or her fee expectations in other cases? Is the usual ad-
vice given in a product liability case appropriate in an essentially administrative
system for resolving claims?
... Articles about the Dalkon Shield case indicate that some lawyers are repre-
senting thousands of Dalkon Shield claimants. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, How Two
Young Lawyers Got Rich by Settling IUD Liability Claims, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24,
1982, at 1 (reporting on two plaintiffs' attorneys representing over 900 claimants);
Malcolm Gladwell, Latest Fight in a Long Case: Attorney Fees; Victims' Lawyers
Getting Too Much, Critics Contend, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1989, at HI (attorney
representing 1000 Dalkon Shield claimants and still searching for more); Women
Reject Settlement Offers From Stingy Dalkon Shield Trust, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Nov. 14, 1991, at D4 (attorney representing 1000 clients). With lawyers represent-
ing such large numbers of claimants, obvious questions arise-notably, whether
these lawyers even have the time for individual communication or consultation
with their clients. See Jack B. Weinstein, A View From the Judiciary, 13 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1957, 1963 (1992); Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 17, at 325.
" For example, when there is a fixed compensation pool, do attorneys have
any duty to those who are unrepresented? Do they have any duty to their other
clients? How far should attorneys go in "cooperating" with the Trust? How can
attorneys who represent numerous claimants fairly advise clients who have ob-
tained the first offers when the attorneys may owe a considerable amount to lend-
ers who have carried them while waiting for settlements to be administered? See,
e.g., Gladwell, supra note 108, at H1. A plaintiffs lawyer with a multitude of cli-
ents dismissed criticisms of his high contingent fees by stating he had his own
financial concerns to worry about. In representing his Dalkon Shield claimants, the
lawyer became $1 million in debt and paid $100,000 a year in interest.
11' Most claims are settled on this basis, on the forms submitted and on medi-
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rule and similar state provisions protect the interests of class
members when hundreds or thousands of persons have similar
claims."' The need for judicial supervision is demonstrated
by the Dalkon Shield claims resolution process, in which many
lawyers have hundreds, and even thousands, of clients. Like
many large class actions, the Dalkon Shield claims process
features large contingency fees for lawyers and a limited com-
pensation fund for clients."'
cal records, rather than by negotiation or formal dispute resolution. The contingent
fee arrangement is supposed to shift risks from the client to the attorney-the
high risk of litigating justifies a high fee. Commentators have criticized the use of
high contingent fee arrangements in claims resolution, as opposed to litigation,
contexts because the high risk does not exist. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos
Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO
L. REv. 1819, 1837 (1992); Brickman, supra note 90, at 74; Coffee, Regulation,
supra note 34, at 889-94. Charging high contingent fees but not assuming any risk
is arguably unethical. See Brickman, supra, at 1837 (calling it "illegal and uneth-
ical" as well as "grossly exorbitant" to collect contingent fees under such circum-
stances); Brickman, supra note 90, at 53 (charging 33 to 40% contingency fee is
violative of "the fiduciary obligation to deal fairly with the client" when risk of
nonrecovery is low).
In the case of a properly screened Dalkon Shield claim, risk of nonrecovery is
minimal. Lawyers know exactly how much they can expect from any single Option
1 or Option 2 claim simply by checking the Trust's damage schedules. Although it
is possible to recover from $125 to over $1,000,000 in Option 3, the medical evi-
dence, and not the skill of the lawyer in "presenting" a claim, is determinative.
Arguably, the lawyer's skill and "risk" factors are relevant only if the claimant
rejects the Option 3 offer and elects trial or arbitration. One commentator, in
describing the asbestos claim resolution process, noted that it is "unfathom-
able . . . why lawyers continue to be paid on a contingency basis since the pro-
cessing of asbestos claims has become relatively simple." Lu, supra note 90, at 49.
Although the medical issues are not always simple, the claims resolution process
in the Dalkon Shield Litigation is very straightforward.
"' The Federal Rules provide for adequate representation of class members to
protect the due process interests of the class and of the adversary. See FED. R.
CIV. P. 23.
.12 See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 90, at 65 ('[c]ontingent fee retainer agree-
ments require . . . unparalleled judicial supervision"); Weinstein & Hershenov,
supra note 17, at 289 ("[W]ith a limited compensation fund, court control over
fees . . . is desirable."). Courts, however, have been reluctant to assume this func-
tion. See, e.g., Brickman, supra note 110, at 1838 n.72 (there is a "Virtual com-
plete failure of the courts to exercise superintendence"); Coffee, Regulation, supra
note 34, at 897 ('[The general attitude of courts ... has been one of benign
neglect.").
As noted above, the courts generally do not become involved in overseeing
attorneys' fees. The only exception is the class action, where, in fact, judges do act
as guardians of the class members' interests with respect to attorneys fees. See
Lu, supra note 90, at 61; Weinstein & Hershenov, supra note 17, at 326. In class
actions, due process demands that judges protect the interests of absent class
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Moreover, the ethical issues are not confined to lawyers'
behavior."' In a settlement providing for an alternative dis-
pute resolution scheme and traditional litigation, how can
Trustees, who are charged to act as fiduciaries, do so knowing
that at least some subset of claimants will become adversaries?
The fact that these several issues already exist suggests the
need to consider developing a new professional ethic for mass
tort cases.
CONCLUSION
I have previously written that a claims resolution facility
that ensures a fair and efficient distribution of an adequate
compensation fund justifies a departure from the traditional
autonomy model because it ensures equality of treatment for
all injured parties, as opposed to potential windfalls for some
claimants, and no recovery or inadequate recoveries for oth-
ers.' It appears that the DSCT is achieving success when
measured against this test.1 5
The success of the DSCT has serious implications for re-
solving claims of women and other traditionally less powerful
persons, or for any victims of a mass tort. The problem is how
to develop a plan that results in the distribution of the most
money to the victims in such a way that the victims feel that
justice has been served. This may require a drastic change in
the professional ethic of the participants in the tort system.
members. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940). Because of the inherent
difficulties a lawyer has in assisting hundreds of clients with their claims, such
clients are in a position similar to class members, particularly through the claims
resolution process. Accordingly, the due process rationale for requiring court super-
vision may well apply to the Dalkon Shield claimants. As discussed earlier, many
claimants are represented by lawyers with thousands of clients, making individual
contact extremely difficult. Further, requiring a claimant to pay a large contingen-
cy fee to a lawyer who has provided little assistance with her claim undermines
her satisfaction with the settlement offer.
"' Indeed, the Trust's policies are designed to achieve a resolution of all claims
in the shortest possible period of time. If more claimants were to elect trial and
arbitration, rather than to settle at Option 3, the Trust would be in business for a
far longer time. Thus, the Trust's policies, which provide incentives to settle rather
than to litigate, should cause the Trust to go out of business sooner rather than
later.
.1. See generally Vairo, Dalkon Shield, supra note 1.
... See generally Weinstein, supra note 24.
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Without such a change, the resolution of mass tort cases may
well remain intractable. Effective use of existing and proposed
consolidation techniques depends on the evolution of our indi-
vidual-centered adversarial system to a group-centered model
of advocacy.
